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In no age in the history of the world has the irventive
-nd progressive genius of man been so alert and its efforts so
signally rewardel as in the present. Peculiarly true are these
words when applied to the latter half of the ninteenth century.
The enormous investment of capital and the marvelous progress in
the field of labor,has given rise to the use of mechanical appli-
ances,which render the employment of persons engaged in their
operation more hazardous than former methods. The construction
and operation of railroads and the prosecution of gigantic man-
facturing enterprises by corporations have done much to increase
the perils of the laboring class.
The object of this paper is to exasnin,briefly,the law as
it has been adapted to the new order of things,and especially as
it relates to the liability of employers for injuries to their
employes. We make no pretence of treating the subject in full
and in all its detail. There are,certain general rules and prin-
ciples of law which by years of recognition and application,have
become the settled law,both in this and in other countries.
Among them we would mention,those which treat of the duties of
the master to his servant,and of the servant to his master. In
this paper they will receive but a passing notice. They Pdmit of
no 5rT:,ont and need only n erca1 stetoent. There are,
however, some modern Nazes of the 12v, ?',.ch Zo sha11 attfxpt to
thorouIghlv investi.ate. Of these the silbjects of rhc are vice-
principles, felluir servants, the tests a'plied! by the severl
states Ps to when P person is a fellow servant -ith ancther, -nd
when P vice-principle, , the origin and ;r wth of the doctrine
of the non-liability of an employer for injuries to his .iplcyes
calsed by the negligence of co-enic;lyes, rill rec:ive no sr!!al
tt ent i-on.
We will also ex-Tine some of Trhe most recert logislation
in various states of tre union, an- in other courtries be-aring
upon the sb.ject ' --ith view of nrewin4 some ccclusion if rpcs-
sible, as to w',hether or rot the tewdency of' the times is to
ircrease or diminish the mployers liability.
I. H. F.
C 0 N T P ! T 3 .
Page.
GThERAL STATnjRTT OF RULSS AND PRINCIPALS
II
DUTI 7'S OF ,IPLOYERS TO SIPLOYES.
1. SPTF PLACS, IN WHICH TO WORK
(A) Ordinary Carc Defined-
2. SAFe TOOLS, MACHIIVRY & APPLIANCES
(A) Duty to use Care in Selection----------------
(B) Duty to Inspect
(C) Defects known to nployer------...........
(D) Obvious and Latent Defects..........
(E) Reasonable time to remedy Defects-------
3. SKILLED AN COMPET,,7TTT SRRVATTS.
(A) Care in their Selection-----------------
(B) Inowmpetency an- Retention
4. ESTABLISHWVETT OF RULES ATD R2GULATIONS--------
III
DUTI 1S OF ,1PLOY ES TO APLOY ERS.
DUTY To BE FREE FROI N£OLIG TC-
DUTY TO OBEY RULES AND R1FGULATIONS-------------
JTJST GIV Q NOTIC" To AfPLOYeR ..........
NON-LIABILITY ANT LTABTLTTY OF 11PTOYMRS.
1. DOCTRIT[C OF TTON-LIABILITY, ITS ORIGIN e GROWTH.
(A) Priestley v. Fowler (1837)............. 16
(B) Murray v. S.C.R.R.Co. (1941) ----------- 19
(C) Farwell v. Boston R.R.8o. (1842) 21
2. D9LqGATION OF 1M AST!R'S DUTY TO OTHERS.
(A) Is not relieved from liability by del-
egating the performance of his duties
to others----- 25
3. SOME MODETRTT RULSS AND TESTS AS TO 17HO ARE
VIC -PRITTCIrALS .T' InTM F fLLOW-S21RVANTS.
(1) Cont.on :rployment Test ------------------------- 28
(2) The Grade or Rank Test-30
(3) The New York or Modern Test-32
4. STATUTORY 3TACTM4TTS ................. ...... ... .. . 64
(A) The Massachusets Act-36
(B) The Georgia Act-37
(C) The Iowa Act-38
(DI The Kansas Act-38
(.?) Similar acts in other States------------------ 39
(F) Are such Acts Constitutional?-..... 39
(G) The &--lish Pnployer's Liability Act 41
C 0 N C L U S I 0 N -- 43
TAB L q 0F CA S !S C I T E D 46
TH a! MOD aRN LAW OF TI-, Li A B I L I T Y 0 P
q-! PLO V R S F o R I J JU RI T S T O
I.
G E NT "R AL STAT T M T T OF R U L 3 1,- R 1 17 C I ? L S
When one person enters into the eploymert of another,
there is an immeiate cnange as to their respective relations.
A change as between themselves, that of Employer and exr.loye,
and also as to their relations to third parties. These new
relations arise purely from contract which is either ex-ressed
or implied. In this contract the parties can cont-7mplate any
service they choose and stipulate any conditions they like as
long as such service or stipulation are not in themselves un-
lawffVl. Tlere is one exception however, to this general prop-
osition wich should be borne in mind, ard that is in no case
car the employer relieve himself from liability tc his plcyos
for injuries received for his ovin criminal neligerce, although
so a-greed by special contract at the time of hire. (1) The
reason being that the law does not excuse him befure the rela-
tions of arployer and Employe exists, so why should it excuse
(1) Little Rock R.R.Co. v. qubanks 3 S.W. Rep. 808.
him when such relations Io exist. Certainly it is only lcgic'al
to conclude that where'a person has placed himself under the
direction ar-i control of anothir, that that fact should tend
to increase an! not dirtinish the liabilit, of the latter to
use greater care and precaution to protect siicn person freeri dean-
ger and injury.
For the purposes of this pwper we shalI1 only deal r'ith
the relation as between toe parties themselves and principally
to determine the liability of the employer for injuri es to those
engage in his Enployment.
TTow iwhen a person eters into the service of another he
cortracts that he is qualified to perforn the duties of the po-
sition he has assomed, and that he takes upon himself the ordi-
nary risks incident to that employment. He further agrees that
he will obey the rules anI regulations laid down by the jrplcyer,
if any, and will at all times be free from regli--ence and warn
the vaster of any defects or impending danger that iay come to
his knowledge. On the oti'er hand, when one person takes
another into his employment he thereby agrees to use reasona-
ble care in furnishing that person with a safe place in which
to work, safe tools, machinery, appliances and material, and to
keep the same in repair and suitable condition, to engage only
competent and skilled co-employes, if any, and if such emplcyes
are numerous to frame an-l promulgate such rules for their obser-
vance as rill t-md to the safety of all.
II
D U T I ! S O F P !PLOv RS TO £ MPLOY ES.
1. SAP" PLAC' IT WHICH To 1VOP'.
The first important iuty of the employer tu his frplcyes
which vwe will discuss, is to furnish them with a safe place in
wbich to work. In tris respect the limit of his duty is only
tc the extent of ordinary care. The la -ices not .c sc far as
to imply a warranty that the place should be absolutely free
of all -anger, neither does it go so far as to make the employetr
en insurer of the lives and !imbs of those enga;ed in his em-
p oyment. It does mean however, that the employer must take
such care in providing for the safety and protection cf his ar.-
ployes as a prudent man would take of himself. But this luty
does not end here. He must see that the place is kept ir safe
ccrlition ard if there is any langer known tc himself and not
to his rployes, he is bound to warn them of that -earger erd
-ct until he has made known the danger so that they f'lly under-
stand the peril to which they are subject is he relieved from
that duty.
(A) Whrt is ordinary care € As the ter ordinary care will
be frequently used in connecticn ,ith this paper, we think it
well at the outset to try and define its meaning. We car per-
haps best accomplish this object by giving the largv'age of a
learned Judge who had occasion to make some comments in applying
the term in an important case. (1)
"Ordinary care cannot be determined abstractly. It has
r'-lation to and must be measured by the work or thing done and
the instrumentali ties used and their capacity for evil as well
as for good. What erculd be ordinary care in one case may be
gross n,-gligence in another. We look to the work, its diffi-"
culties, dangers and responsibilities ar-1 then say what w uld
and should a reasonable and prudent man c in such an exiency."
In conciuning this phase of our subject we vclld say
thqt the tr ie test as to the liability of the erployer in fail-
ing to furn.sh a safe rlace ir which to wcrk, is, was he negli-
gent in so failing to provide, and not was tpe place dangerous,
althou ;h such danger may be of tho ;reatest of importance in
helping to determine the ordinary care required in that particu--
lar case.
(1) Cayzer v. Taylor, 10 Gray 20.
. SAF!7 TOOLS, r.ACINORY'AND APPLTA CES.
An employer is bound to furnish safe tools, miachinery,
appli-rces and material for the use of his employes, ard keep
the sare in repair qnd safe condit:cn.
(A) Bult in selecting and proviiing tocls, viachirery, &c., he
is not bound to procure the latest best irrrcved df its
kini. Nor is he oblig-ed at any time tc change his ol machinery
cr apnliances for the sake of rep lacing ther vith a new inver-
tion, although such invertion does aay in -rhole or ir part with
the danger of in jur, to those operating it. The matter of
selecting tools, machinery,'-c., is al ,ays left wvith the en-
ployer hirself and he car provide such as he pleases provided
always they are reasonably safe. (1) There is no inmplied
warranty in a contract of service that the tcols, machinery,
or material furnished by the Arployer, shall be absolutely safe
" fit for service, nor that the employe shall not be exposed
to extraordinary risks. He -oes not g-ara'rteo the s(undness
of the machinery nor insure the employes against accidert, but
in all these cases he must use ordinary care.
(B) For this reason he is bound to inspect the machinery and
alpliirces in n.is nse, either in person or by substitute, and
see that they are ir safe conrlition for the performance of the
vwork required of them without exposing the operatcr t. an.c  un-
necessary -Ilager of iniury. Tf he n,giects this precaution he
(1) Cregan v. Larstor, 10 !T.Y. Supp. 61 i.
Clairian v.Western Union Co.: So.e ?,, Ro ep~nS
does it at his hpzard.
(C) So if by inspection or othenuise certain -fects' are
known to the erployer an-I not to his eriployes it is his duity
to at once acqtuint them of silch tefe-ts =,! warn thei of Pany
,rger. (1) This rule anlies in particular vwere noe- ?ar ul nu-
snal machinery is introdluced or chap- es marle in the cld involving
unexpected or unsual d--Iger. So it eras hold tiere it arpeared
that a "fan" of a c~rn4 m-chine was -esi:-ed tc be run only
in one l.irecticn, bu t w-1s rnir-ing irrthe wrong 'iirecticn Prr
Vwitb no guard, so Ps to be ahngerous, that the plaintiff who
ha! no notice of the danger, anI was thereby injured, was erti-
tled to recover ai- ages from his employer. f2) In general it
can be said, that the 3uty of the employer to wart. his eployes
of danger, regardless of the rule tnat the latter take upon
tomselves the usual risks incidert to the evr;ployment, is, that
if there exists any facts known to the emrloyer that render the
emqployent unnsualI, hazardious he is bouni to Usclose those
facts, anI if he f'-ils to -loso, and by reason of such urusrel
hazard, the employe is injurel the employer is chargeable with
nei.igerce, in- responsible for the injury. (3)
Bvt the fact that an emnloye has been notified of the
d.efective con-ition of an a-rliance or 5 machine with which he
(1) Cregan v. Marston, 10 T."7.Supp. P,:l.
(2) White v. Worsted Co., 11 N.?. 'ep. 75 (Mass.)
(3) Sizer v. Syracuse, 7 Lansin# Per. 67 (I.Y.)
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works, does not necessarily charge him with contributary negli-
gerce or assumption of the risk by continuinr to vse stcn ar-
pliance. The employers dut.r goes f-.rther, he rust exrlain to
sch erploye so that he un-lerstmnds, or ought ir the exerci se
of ordinary prudence to understard, the risk to wbich the de-
fect or dlm-er exposes him. (1)
(n) When the -lefert or danger is obvious *--7 the employe
has as gool an opportunity to see or liscover it as the eorplcyer
then the latter is excused from giving notice. (2) This rule
also epTlies where the defect is latent. So it was hold in an
action a,,ainst a Rail Road Co. for personal injuries to f
-rploye by reeson of the breaking of a defective drawhead, where
the evidence leaves it just as probable as rot tbet thu defect
ii.ay have been -- latent defect which no inspnction would have re-
vealed, a judgment for the plaintiff cannot be sustained. (3)
But in some states it is held that the emplcye has f
right to assume tit instrumnrts an- appliarces furnished by his
rrployer are safe -nd sound (4) -rd fe is =nder no obligation
to inspect them before putt ing them into use in order to discov-
er litent defects. (5)
(6) It is a well recognized rule of law that whore the ar,-
ployer has been notified of s-me defect or imperfection of the
(1) uotilla v. Duluth Lumber Co., 33 r:.W.Rep. 50t_.(Mirn.)
(P) Hickey v. Taaffe, 105 N!.Y. 96.
(3) Band v. Sith, 101 1T.Y. 661.
(4) Grarnis v. Chicago St. P.R.R.Co.,46 N.1T.Rep. 1067.
(5) Banks v. Wabash R.R.Co., 40 Mo. App. 458.
tools, machinery or appliances rhich are in his use, th-t he
uist be illowed a reasonable time in .rhich tc reinoly such ?e-
fects without beirn, nei.10rt l'rI liable for any accid'rt thet
may herren imnmelietely after surch notice. What is a reasonable
time, ftepen-s upon the p-rticular case -r- the circtumstances siLr-
rounding it. But it has been held that where an employe ccn-
tinues in a langerous service in conseqntence of the errployer's
assurance that the danger would be removed, precludes the as-
sumption that the employe by rmaining assumes the risk, ar-4d
recovery can be had for an injury caused by the defect after
the lapse of e reascr5ble time for its correction. (1)
(1) N!ew Jersey : .V.R.R.Co., v. Young, 47 Fe-1. Rer. 723.
3. SKILL 'T AT COM P ?T 1 TT S-,RT.1ANTS.
(A) The third important duty which the erploye:" owes tc his
employes, that we orill mention, is that he will secure only
skilled an- competent fellow omploves to work with them. But
ir t1-is as ir other respects he is obliged to use only ordlinary
care. The reason for the performarce of tJ-is third duty by
the employer to his Employes, w" find in an Th1ish case (1)
%,1hiri the Courts used the followin- l nvage" "The servant
when he e'-ages to rtin the risk of the service includles those
arising from the nc,,ligerce of fellow servarts, has a right to
understn-1 that the raster has taken reasonable care to protect
him froxn sich risks by associatirn him only with persons of or-
linary skill ar-3 care."
(B) The general rule is that notice or knowledge of irccm~p-
tency is necessary to charge the employer after he has vised
reasonable care in their selection. For when a suitable per-
son has once been eriployed there is not the saire reason for ex-
ercising such a high degree of diligence. Goo,! character and
proper qualifications once possessed may be presumed to ccntinue
'r- there is no reason ,hy the eployer must not re, upon that
presumption as to those personal iualities until he has had
notice of a change or knowledge of suich fact as wculd put a rea-
sonable man upon inquiry. (2) But ahen once the erployer has
(1) Hutchinson v. Railway Co., 5 Exch. 343.
(2) Chapman v. Prie R.R.Co., 55 N.Y. 579.
notice of the incompetency of' a person in his employ, or such
knowledge as would arouse suspicion .)rd inquiry in a pru'dert
yrp,, the it is his duty to discharge silch incompetent poerscn,
-.t once a n - to retain him in the er .Tloyment is as mi'ch of a
breach of Iity ?.n- a ground for liability as the original em-
ployment of -r ircanpet-nt person.
In conclu-Iing our remarks upor this phase of the sub-
ject we m-ny say that the main point in an action a5-i st 5r ir-
plcyer by an ezr.ploye to recover ,amaes for irjuri es ca,'sed by
the negligence or incompet'ncy of a co-employe Ierenr.s upcr the
negligence of the employer in employirg or retaining such person.
For that reason it becomes necessary in each particular case
to inquire what the particular luty of the employer was to the
injured emrloye ir relaticn to the employment of otber persons
tc engage in the same business, ar-! "Phet degree of care a'r-
-7iligence in that respect he was require:. to exercise.
4. 9STABTJSHMI TT OF RULPS AND RRGULATIO1!S.
The fourth and last duty which the employer owes to his
,'ployes, of which we will treat, is th-At in case such emplcyes
are rumerous he rtust frame and promull.ate such riles and regu-
lations pertaining to their government as will tend to r;.ke the
enrloymriet reascnably sn-fe to all. It is not necessary that
personal notice of such rules should be -,iver to all . In case
of railway corporations such a task would be as impossible as
it would be unreasonable. The ' uty of th? employer in the
resp ect of givin,, notice to his employes is performed when
he provides beforehand ani makes known to Trem rules explicit
and efficient, which, if obeyed and fallowed by all crcerned,
will bring person-l notice to every one entitled to it. (1)
Neither is the employer bound to make rules to provide
against some unknow an1d unforeseen danger. So it has b eer
held in New York (2) that a railway company is riot liable to an
eiploye for in iuries received, or the ground of its failure to
rcke regulations ehich right have prevented the accident causing
such injury, when zho accident was occasioned by circumstances
,,hich could not have been reasonably anticipated, anr where a
compliance with the general body of rules and the exercise of
ord-inary care and prud-rce by the empIcyes woulft heve avoided it.
(1) Slater v. Jewitt, 85 N.Y. 62
(2) Berrigan v. I.Y. L..R.R.Co., 131 N.Y.,582.
TII
DT T I - S OF R M P L 0 Y RS TO EM,1PLOY 2RS .
1. DUTY TO BF FRP FROM'; N 'GLIG 'TCR.
As a result of our examination of the d!uties of the
employer to those ongage1 ir his employment, we fin A that the
price of his immunity from liability is vigilence, sG nloW we
find on th sile of the employe, the first important qresticr to
be sctlled when he seeks !-imn-ges for an injury, is, ras ho
free frc negligence. The la- imposes upon every perscn the
duty to use ordinary care for his own protection arA. security
against accident, and he -,ho -.ocs not use such care, and injury
results is deemed guilty of contributary ne-ligence, which in
itself is a full an3 coiplete bar to recovery.
In some states, however, the question of the liability
of the dtfendant in case of contributary negligence or fault
by the plaintiff is determined by comparison; the A.cctrine being
termed the doctrine of comparative negligence. The principle
is that the plaintiff is considered entitled to recover if the
defendants negligence exceeds his own, and that the def-rjant
is not liable df the plaintiff's negligence is equal to or exceed
his ownc.
In Nlew York and1 in many other states the Courts oill at
once disriss a case upon the appearance of contributary negligence
2. DUTV TO OB~v RULqS AND RRGULATIONS.
An employe cannot recover from his employer damages for
an injury which was the direct result of his own disobedience
of orders. (1) This is a well settled rule of law and a-rr.its
of no argument. It is but rJ;ht and just that where an epluy-
er has framed certain rules or regulations forbid!Jng soire dnn-
gerous nractice, that they should be obeyed, and he who diso-
beys them and receives injury thereby, is barred from recovery.
The following short quotations are taken from cases that arose
in various parts of the union, as will be observed.
"Where an employer engaged in remmiving freight, lowered
through -- hatchway into the hold of a vessel, stands under the
open hatchway when forbidden to Jo so, cannot recover from his
rmployers if he is injured by freight falling through the
oping upon him." (2)
"Where a railroad company by rule forbids its brakemen
from -oin- between freight cars to couple them and provides that
coubpling must be done by means of a stick, the company is not
liable for the death of a brakeman where such death was the
result of disobedience of such rule. (3)
Plaintiff's testator, a brakeman, was charged vith the
inspection of certain cars ad w, hose dIuty it was to see that
they were in F*ood order and if' found defective, to seaid them to
---------------------------- -------------------------------------
(1) Knight v. Cooper, 14 S..Rep. 9 9 9 .(West Va.)
(2) Mc Carthy v. Lehigh Va. Transp. Co., 51 Y.W.Rep. 430.
(3) Russell v. Richmond R.R.Co., 47 Fed. Rep. 204.
the repair shop anl not to T se them. In dIisregard, of srch
orders he ised a disabled car arl was injured. Held that he
could not recover. (1)
Where an employer in a factory, in violation of the rules
of his employer attempted to uise a freight elevator for his
owr convenience in --oing from one floor of the factcry tc ar oth -
er, and fell lown the elevator shaft, the employer is rot.liable
though the elevator shaft was not provided with automatic doors
as required by law. (2) The same rule is alsc laid down ir
the followin5 cases.
Ac 9lligott v. Randolph, 22 At. Rep., 1094. (Conr.)
Hannah . Conn. R.RCo., 28 N.S.Rep. 682.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Shields v. IT.Y. Cen. A H.R.R.Co. 133 r.., 557.
(2) Guenther v. Lockhart, 16 }.F. Supp. 717.
3. MUST GIV MTOT!C! To 1[PLOVYR.
As we found it one of the duties of the eirloyer to
warn his e FIoyes of known defects a-r- nr-:,ers, sc now we find
that it one of the Iities of the eirployes to -;ive notice to the
rloyer bd any defects or dangers that me y be knovyr tL him,
2rd if he fails so to do, then he is hell to have essuined the
risk, andI if injiiiry results he canot recover. This duty to
tyive notice to the eirployer is of no small importarce ir case
of the incompetency of a co-employe.
The employer is bound to use due care both in procuring
anXV retaining suitable persons in his employment anA m: ust use
such care at all times in determining whether they remain skilled
and competent, yet if ar employe knows that a co-employe is
incompetent, unskilled, habitually careless and negligent, and
fails to notify the employer of these facts, but continues in
the service he must be held to have assumed the risks and hazards
arising therefrom. (1)
(1) Hatt v. Nay, 10 N. '.Rep., 807.
0 C T R I N P 0 F N 0 17 -L I A B I L I T Y o F M P L 0 YMR
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1. ITS ORIGIN AND GROWTH.
It is a well settled principle of law both J.r this and
ir other countries, that in Employe cF ,rot mr7int-jn a. action
agairst his employer to recover dgr q:es for inuri es sustained
through the megligence or carelessness of a co-E.ploye cr fol-
low-servant.
(A) The ori±in of this doctrine, as far as our research has
enabled us to discover, is to be found in the case of Priestley
v. Fowler, (1) rTich arose in -Tn.and in 1-37. Altkhougt' this
case does not directly involve the question of negligence cf,
fellow-servants, and therefore cannot be s'iid tc have in itself
established the octrine, yet it ras the corner stone, so to
speak, or Pfich that structure was to be reared, c7rr beirg th-.,
first case to be found, that deals with the question at hand
whatsoever, we consider it of no small importance.
The statement of the facts in zhe case are ns follows:
The p! intiff was a butcher in the employment of the deferj.-cnt
-~ ~ ws sent on a journey to deliver goods, ard rhile riding in
a van conducted b, another enploye vras injured by beirg thrown
tc the 1rourd through the breakin, doon of the van.
(1) Priestiey v. Fovrler, 3 Mees. R- W. I.
The evidterce showed that the van ffas out of repair ard over-
leaded at thle time of the accidert. On these grc,1nds the
plaintiff' brought cn action a:irst his emrloyer t, reccver
A'lrages for the in-lury. Tt was held that the acticr would net
lie, an-1 in rendering his opinion Lord Abinger C. B. said:
"It is a'Th:itted that there is no precedent fcr the pres-
ent action by a serlant ag' inst his master. We are thereJhre
to deci-le the question upon general principals, and ir 'Icing so
are at liberty to look at the consequences of a :ecision the
one ,-ray or tho oTher.
If the master be liable to the servant ir this act icn
the principle of the liability ni 11 be found to carry us tc an
altrmin extent. He vho is responsible by his g neral diity,
or b- the terms of his contract, fcr eli the conseq ierces cf
neg-ligerce in a r atter in which he is the principle, is re-
sponsible for the negligence of all qis inferior ag-rts.
If the owner of the carriage is therefore responsible for the
siifficiency of his carriage to his servrrts, he is responsible
for the negligence of his coache mn, or his harness-maker. The
footman, therefore, who rides behind the carriage, may have an
action against his matter for a defect in the carriage owirn; to
the negligewce of the coach maker, or for a defect in the harness
arising frcir the nfgligence of the harness f-ker, or for drunk-
enness, neglect, or want of skill in the coachman; nor is there
any reason why the principles should not, if applied in this
ciass of cases exten -1 to many others, The mtster, for exrryle,
wo'lld be liable to the servrart for the ne,l ";erce of the chEi-
ber-maid, for putt.in; him in, a dITir bei; for that of the ur -
holster for sen-ing in a crazy be-1stead whereby he was mpade to
fEll Jlown while asleep an-] injure himself; for the negli-jece
of the cook, in not properly cleaninrg the copper vessels used
in the kitchen; o" the butcher, in not sunFlying the fa uily writh
goon wholesome meat; of the btiilder for a defect in the 'cunda-
tion of a house whereby it fell an-3 injured both c ster and
servart by zhd ruins.
The inconsistency not to say the absurdity of these
consequences afford a sufficient ar-,ument against the arplica-
tion of this principal to the present case. But in truth the
riere relat3on of the raster qrA. the servant, never can imply
an obligation on the part of the ,nester tc take itcre care cf
his servant than he may reasonable b exrectel to ' c of him-
self. He is, no -oubt, boun-i to provi de for the safety of his
servpnts in the course of their arployrent , to the best of
his .uy-'-7e -qt, i no-mPt ior olief. Thie servart is rot bound
to risk his safety in th- service of his m-ter, ar- ray, if
he thinks fit, Jecline ary service in which he reascncbly ap-
pr- her s injury to himself; an-I in rost of the c .ses in vnich
!-rger mny be increased, if not in all, he is ji.st as liable to
be acqu7'inted ,,ith the probability nirl extent of it, as the
i ,aster."
(B) The first case, however, in Mhich the employers lia-
bility to pn eirploye who was injured throuvh the ne-;ligence of
a co-emnploye was the Iirect issue, !nd the employer's exemrticn,
declare, arose in South Carolina in 1841, (1) in that case Tlc.in-
tiff was eniaged as a firern on a locomotive used by defen1_3nts
upon their rail rcad. While thus engage,! in the -discharge of
his tties, the enogine was thrown from the track through the
ne-igence and carelessness of the engineer, resultirg in. the
injury complained of. Two opinions were written holding that
the pl-intiff couli not recover. One oririon by Judge v ans
ar,1 the other by Chancellor Johnson, Judge Richardson, Earl,
Butler, Hnrper 9nd Dunkin, concurring.
Juige evans said: "In tqe consideraticn of' the question
irvolved in the case, I sh~1l assume that th e verdict establish
the fact that the plaintiffs injury was the result of the negli-
gerce of the engineer and that the question arises whether the
railroad company is liable to one servant 2cr an injury arising
through the ne-gligence of another servant.' ..... "It waz urged
in the argument, that if the engineer had been the ovwn er of the
road he Fould have been liable. Of this I appreherd the-e
vonl be no doubt, but ther his limbility would have arisen,
not fre- his b eing the oirn er, but becal' se the inj ury arose f m
his own act. Thatvhe is now liable, seems to me tc a,:it of
no doubt. But it by no means follows as a consequence th-t be-
- - --! r- - - - -. S.C.-.R.Co., 36 Am. D-c. 9;i9.
cause he is liable, those rho Pi-ployed hir c-.re liable 'lso.
With the pl~nrtiff, the defaant contracted Tc pay hi her fcr
his services. Is it incident to thqt ccrtract th:,t the comrpany
should --varantee him -ainst the negligence of his cc-serv2rts?
It is alritt,d that he takes tron rnimself the or-linary risk of
his vocAtion; why not the extraorlinary risks? YTeithor are
wo-ithin his contract, anl T car see no re,.son fcr a-ling tfis
tc th3 elread-y known anr- acknowledg'ed liability of a c-.rrier,
without a si-ngle case or precedent to sustain it. The engineer
no more represente't the company that the rl-intiff. Each in
his several department represents his principle. The re.cular
moventt of the train of cars to its destination is the resUlt
of the orlinary performance by e-ci, of his several duties.
If the firema neglects his part the on1ine st-rds still fcr
want of steam; if the en-ineer neglects his, everything; runs to
riot an dlisaster. It seems to me it is on the pert of the
sever-el agents - joint Liniert,'king, t"here each one stipulates
-or the performrnac-! of his several nprts. They are rot liable
to the c(tipany for the conduct of each other, nor is the company
liable to one for the misconduct of another; and as a general
rule, I woul! soy, that fyere there was no falt ir the o Yuer
he would not be li-ble orly forw-ges to his servarts."
Chancellor Johnson in his opinion concurs with Judge
Pvans and avone other things says: " The foundation of aell
legal liability is in the omission to do some act which the
law comnfds, th_ uomnission of scinD act which t}e 1-w prohibits
or the violation of somo contract, by which the party is injured.
There is no law regulating the luti es of the ovnersoof a steam,
car, ani the persons employed by them to conduct it. The
li~b ility, if -nr y,ttaches. must therefore arise out of ccr-
tract, What Pr s the contract between these parti es" The
pll-tiff in consideratin that defendant wo'll pay him so much
money, undertook to perform the services ae firemtan or. the
train. That is all that expressed. Is there anythir.-- .cre
imprlied? Asstuning thot the injury -cne was in ccnsequence of
the negligence of the. engineer, the defendart wci'ld not b- lia-
bin' inless they undertook to answer for his dili-erco and skill.
Is that implied" I think not. The law never ir.plies an cbli-
-,atiun in relation to 1 m-tter about Phich the r rti , are or
may with proper dIiligence oe equally informS."
(C) But the most important case upon this question, arose
in Massachusets in 1842, (1)one year later th-n the South Care-
line case. The opinion Was Written by Chief Judge Shaw of the
Supreme Court of that State and has been pprcved ir most of
the states of the Union an-_ indorsel and followed by many of
the English Corts.
In t-is case a switchm.an carelessly left a switch opEm,
thereby throwing a train frcc, the track, and irjuring th 3 engirn-
(1) Farwell v. Boston R.R.Co., 4 Metc. 49. 38 Am, Dec. 339.
eer, Who thereupon brought n action against the copanly to
rc, (ver dan-ges. It was shown thqt the switchmen was a care-
fl1 amn_ tristworthy servant. The Court hel-d that no recovery
could be had. Judge Shaw in his opinion says; "This is an
ectior of new impression in our courts ard involves a prinpiple
of great import-nce. It presents a case where two perscns are
in the service an- errioyment of one corpany whose business it
is tv conrtct Pd r1 aintain a rail roa'3, and rxploy their
trpirs of cars to carry persons ar4 merchanise for hire.
They are nrrcinted ar- rployed by the s-me c~rpn.ny to per orm
separate 'uties an'L ser -ices, il tending to the acccrplish.nErt
of one and the s-me pur-ose, that of the safe ari rapid trans-
mission of thr trains; -znd they are -id for th ir respective
services to the nature of their respective duties, ard the labor
ar-1 skill required for their proper perfcrmarce. The question
is whether for damages sustained by one of the perscrs sc an-
ployed, b'y i-eqrs of the carelessness and n,-li ,,ence of arncet-r,
the pzrty injured has a remedy ag-irst the cornmon -nployer.
The generU. rule resulting- from consideration as well of jus-
tice as of policy, is that he who ergages 7r th F-r.plcyment of
arother for the performpece of special dIuties Pr-' services for
cempensati-or, tlkes upon himself the netural anr ord inary risks
-1 -erls ir cideIrt to the perfo r-ce cf such service, ar w
are rot awcere of enry principle which except the perils arising
from the cerel-ssness an 1 negligence of those who Pre in the
slme acrloyment. They are perils rhich the servart is as
likely to know an agairst which he can as effectrt'lly g!'ar'd,
ns the in-ster. They Pre perils incidentato the ser,ice and
which can be as distinctly foreseen an- provyde! for ir the
rate of compensation as any other Where several perscns
are:. employed in the conduct of one corfaon enter-prise or irder-
teking an-i the sEfety of each to a great extent depends or the
cre and skill ,ith which each shall perf.,m his ?%pointed -11ty,
each is -n observer of th- conduct of the other, c.r give
,otice or iny misconduct
le'.ve the service if the c(
prec,-ution 3r- errlov such
partv may require. By ti
be' Luch more effect,-lly s
tc the c mmon employer fcr
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It was a voluntary un-lert-kinz on his part Yrith a full krowledge
of the risks incileRt to the erplovinet; -n1 the loss was sI's-
t air Pd by means of car or'linary caualty, causei bY the negl ience
of another servant of the ccnmpany. U-ner the circurmst-rces the
loss i-ust be -leerned to be the resilt of o- pure accident, like
those to ohich -,ll men, in all emplcymm rts 'r! at all times, are
izore or less exposed; c-r-' like similar losses from ncci-lental
causes, it must rest Fhere It first fell unless pl~int iff has
e remedy aainrst the person actuelly in Ief-vIlt."
T) 1, qATIOT OF MAST R'S mJ'1 "S TO OTH 'P.
(A) From previous exiqTination of the subject we found that
the emloyer was lieble to his employes whore the injury was
the lirect result of his own ne;Iiience, ard that this princi-
ple eas bhsed upon morality and public policy. The cmplcyer
can delegate the performance of the luties he owes tc his cirpluye
to another person or persons, which is -lw.,s dIcne th ,-, case case
of corporations, but he can never relieve himself of liability
by such delegation. Any person to whom such duti es have been
delegated, namely" the furnishing a safe place jn which tc work,
safe tools, machinery an-! appliarces. the .irir-g ?n'l .ischerging
of employes, c.c st--nds in the place of the crplcyer P. is
called a vice-principle. Any ne-li-:ence of the vice principle
is the n glience of the principle, for rhich he is responsible.
Some authorities hold that there is no excerticn to this rrle,
which is, if the employer has exercised re- sonenble care in the
selectior of those, to whom he delegeates the Ittics he owes tc
those engee ir his employment, then he is excused from lia-
bility fcr their negligence. (1) BErt we believe that the New
York doctrine (2) is the better and prevailin:- one, which is:
"That acts whig;h thematter, as sich, is bound tc:IpcrfoMr for
tbe safety and protecticn of his emplcyes cannot be 'elegated
(1) Clark v. Holmes, 7 t.X! Y. 937;
(2) Fuller v. Jewitt, 80 T.Y. 46; Kein v. Smith 8O IT.Y. 48;
ST. Y. 8, 79 "T. Y. 0.
SO as to exonerate the former from liability to a servant who
is injured by theomission to perfo.u th3 act or duty, or by its
Tegligent pirformnce, whether the ncnfeasance or misfeasance is
that of a superior officer, agent or servant te wher. the doing
of the ict or the performance of the -duty h-i been committed.
In either case, in resp- ct to such acts or duty, t' e servant
Yho unrdertakes or oi ,its to perfonrm it, is the representative of
themn master, anr. not a mere co-servant P'Ith the one who sustained
the in iury. "
This h s been e tc be the lv ir a large nuirber
of States*:
Holden v. Fitchburg R.R.Co., 129 Mass.'268; Drymala v.
Thompson 26 inr.40; Wid;woo-1 v. Chicago &c.,E.R.Co.4l
Wis.473 ; Sh-nny v.Andersor Mills,66 Mle.,420;11ullan v.
Phil,S.Co.,79 Pa.St.2 5 ; Chicago R.R.Co.v.Sweet,45 Ill.
197; Lewis v. Louis.R.R.Co.59 Mo.495; Kansas ?c.R.R.Co.
v.Little,19 Kan.269; Berea Stone Co. v.Kraft,31,Ohio St.
237.
We have now made a somewhat carefull examination of the
origin and growth of the doctrin of the rom-liability of an. em-
ployer for injuries to his employes through the negligence of
co-employes. We now come To treat of its application,and in so
doing we will m-et with no small confusion and 'ifficulty. It
is safe to say that the courts of this and other countries rec-
ognize and approve the wisdom and legality of the cdcctrin; it is
only when the doctrin is to be applied to special cases that
courts divide an-I text-writers disegree. There are three great
tests in the United States to determin when an emplcyc is a
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ViCe-principal and when a co-employe to other employes with whcr.e.
he is association. They are generaly known as theCommon %plcy-
ment test,the Grade or Rank test, an,! the New York or 1Mcdern test
We will now take them up in their order,as giveh abcve,and this
can best be dotc by examirir:, some of the leading cases which
lay .own and affirm the rules applicable tc each.
3. SO1. MOD')N T STS AND RULES.
1. The common employment test originated ir Massachuscts
and was applied in the celebrated Farwell case. In that case
Chief Ji'd-,e Shaw sid'. Whe the object to be ecc anr lished is
one -r-q the s-'me, Prhen the employers -re the s-7,ie, enr- the
-v prsLns ,PJloy' l. -erive their authority and their cur.-
pe-'s-t(rn from the sn, source, it ,eoul, be extramelv difficvllt
tc -1jstinuish what constitutes ore deportirent Prd what a -is-
tinct departmEnt of duty. It goul vnrv itb the circu~,.st-mnces
of every case. If it were m de to depend upon the nearness
or distance of the persons from each other, the quvsticr waoild
immediately arise, how near or how distnrt must thT-y be, to
be in th- s-roe or differe-te dep-rtment? In a blacksmith shop,
persons workirg in th? sa. e buildin-,, at different fires, may
be qi1ite infleperdent of each other thouih only a few feet dis-
tant. In e rope elk several may be at vork on th- sarme
pfece of cordlae, at The same time, at mn ,y hundred feet dis-
tant from each oth -r, and beyond t h reach of si-;ht and voice,
and yet actinr- tog-ther." ()
T-is test wps ,rplied in an im portart :Tnglish case
which ceme before the Courts in l 58.(2) In that case the
parties injurel frere minors crnloyed to rcrk ir e coal pit
enM the rarty whose n 4ligence calsed the injury was emplyed
(1) Fatrwell v. Boston I;c. R.R.Co., 4 Metc. 49; 38 Am. D. 339.
(2) Bartonshill Coal Co. v. M c Quire, 3 Macq. H.L. Cas. 300.
tu -ttend to thea engine by which tey were let -o,,m into the
.,iAe end brougt out, and the coal w!s r ,Jsed which they had
d,, -- 'I it was held tt they were engaged in a car~r.on rcrk,
that of gettin coal from, thU pit. In discussing the qrzes-
t ion. of cor,,on e 1nplo~vv.ent tht- Court said" "The miners ctp id
not p rlor their part unless they e:ero lowered to their work;
ror coulid the end of their cw:mon labor be attained unless
the coa.l whicb they got wes rfised to the pit's mouth; Frfd cf
couirse, at the close of their -ays l'bor the workmen mist be
lifted out of the ,ine- - It is necessary, however, ir
oech particular case to ,scert,,in ,hether servants Fre fellow
laborers in the s- work, becelse -'ithough a servant may be
taken to have engaged to enccunter all riks .*,hich are irci-
dent to the service rhich he has undertaker, yet he carrt be
ey.pected to articipate those which may hapTen to himr cn occa-
sions foreign to his eployment. Where servants, therefore,
?re engaged in different departnents of duty -nd injury connitted
by one servant upon afnother, by carelessness or ncj;!igonce in
tho cutirse of his particular ,ork, is not witfin the, exarption
nnd the masters liability attaches in tnat case ir the sar e
m-'r er e.s if th injured servants orere in no such relation to
him."
In another ;n4lsh case Lord Broughtin said: "To bring
thle case within the exemption there must. be this most
r.ateril qu l-fi cation; that the two serv .rts must te r,-e ir
the sae c or .,o employment, nn1 engaged ir the saie cwr on ',ork
unde • that coammon rployme t."
(2,) The grade or rank test. In the cebrated case of
th - Chicago 1,. '. St. Paul R.R.Co. v. poss, 112 U. S. 377;
the Supreme Court of the United States held.
1. That the conductor of -2 rail road train who cornarnds its
movererts, "'irects -rher it shall start, at what stati:cns it
shal] stop, ani at what speed it sh11 run, _nd hps th- greral
ir]nagemrt of it, and control over the p(.rsons engaged upon it,
represents the company, an-i for injuries resulting from his
neli lgent acts, the cxrprny is responsible.
2. The engineer is in th' t particular the conductcr's subor-
rn ate and for the formers neigence, by which the latter is
injured the c mpary is responsible.
Th'e case oririrnrlly arose in th? State oP 1:innesota, Judge
Field n ote the opinion an i after reviewing the hisTc -y of the
doctrine of the e"p-loyers exaopt :on as it hod been aprlied in
the various Courts in this country and ir Fm-1land, said2 "There
is in our j'd gn-nt, a clear dlistinction to be made in their re-
l tion to their common principle between servants of . corpora-
tion, exerclsir:, no surervision over others er-ared rith th. m
i, the sLre em ploym-rnt, an- agent of the c orpo rat ion clothed
with the control m rd i-nag-.rrent of a distinct departmn-t in
rhich their -!uty is entirely that of dir4 cting and superinten-
deInce .
A conductor having the entire control and m-n rgei.,rt of -. rail
w. Y train occupies - very lifferent position frcm the brakeman,
the porters, and- other subordinates emloyed. He is, in 2f'-ct,
nri shoiild be treated as, the person4l representative of the
corporation, for whose negligence he is resronsible to siibordi-
rete servants. This view of .h.is relatin to the ccrporaticn
seems to us a reasonable and just one, F., it will insure more
care in the selection of sch egrts, arin t-us give greater
secuirit y to the servants en-.?ged under him in Er L,'plcyr.-ent re-
quiring the ttmost vlilence on their p -rt, 7=d prompt and -n-
hesitating obelience to his orders. The rule which !pplies to
such agents of one rail way corporation must aprly to ll, ed
many corporations operate every day several t r-'ins over hun-
dreds of miles t great Iistances ap'-rt, each being =(Ier the
control -nd direction of - conductor specially appointed for
its maragem nt. We know from the marner in wnich rail roads
are operated that, subject to the general rules and. orders of
the directors of the company, the conductor has entire control
and m -t.nageV, ent of th.- train to which he is assigned. He
'irects when it, shll st irt, at whizt s-ee-l it shall run, at
vrhet s t ions it shall step an fur Rhat length of time, and
• erything essentiel to its successful movEm r ts, ar, -211 per-
sons employed on it are subordinate tc his orders. Ir no
prop er sense of the term is he a fellow serv--rt with the fire-
mcr , the brak rr. r, the porters, and the engineer. The latter
are fellow serva-nts in the rzirrirg of tb e train ir'4er his -i-
rection, -ho, as to therr, i r the train stlr's in the place of
represents the corpor-itien."
Thd!srule or test recognizes a distinction, as is eppar-
ent from the above, in their relation to their ccr,:nr. irT.rlcver,
betWee serv-nts exercising no svpervisicn over otj- !rs en:,eat-ed
with thimi, ar-1 those wrho lo exercise some ccntrol enr s, pervi-
sicLn, ar-i hove the an!gent of P Uistinct Jopirt-ert of the
irplcyment. This limitation is bosed upon the theory of the
presurme- presence of the principle in reference tc the acts of
servants or agents. It -Ieals altogether iiitP the station or
position which the two (rloyes occupy, an'i overlcoks the cher--
acter of the act out of which the negligent performance or non-
performance the injury arose.
This is known also as the surerior servant lirit7-tion
an, h-,s been adopted in several of the states, notably in Ohio,
Kentucky, Tennessee, Iowa, JTebraska, Missouri and NTcrth Carolina.
3. The Yew York or Modern doctrine. The modern doctrine
or test, and wo believe the on1ly tr2e ci-iterian of ,rhc are
fellow servants, is to bc found in the case of Crispin v.
Babbitt, (1) which was deci'led in New York,in 1880, ani has





() Crispin v. Babbitt , 81 N. Y., 516.
In this case the plaintiff was rcrking as a laborer in
the ircn works of the def , ndant at Whitesboro. Oneida County,
,t the tim e of' tP , accid-ent. He he- assisted to draw F boat
into a dry :ock con ectei 'ith the eorks; after which th-
water in tihe . boat wrs to be pumped out, this was to be done by
rw'ars of a pump operated by -r entwine. While plaintiff ,i-th
others was ,nraged in lifting the fly wheel of th gine off
its certer, one John L. Babbitt carelessly let or the ste-sn,
,r-! started the Pheel, throwdig the pl1intiff on the gearing
wheels, and thus occasioning the injury cuzr;plPined of. B.T.
Babbitt, 'te defendant lived in Nei York City -r-1 visited the
works about once a ronth for q day or two. The evidence ttrded
to show that John L. Babbitt had general cfarge of the works.
The orinion of the Court of Apreals was written by Judge Rapallo
r - emong other things he says: "The liability of the master
do-s not depend upon the grade or renk of the ernloye whcso
ne-,lirence cpsed the injury. A stiprrinterdent of a factory,
althonuh h'vin; power to employ men, or represent the ir9ster
in other respects is, in the r.meragEmrt of the rmachirery, a
0%}llow servant of the other operators. Or tha sare principle,
however low the ra~de or rank of the erploye, the raster is
lieblC for-_Jrjt, ri es c aesed by h.m to other servants, if th ey
result from the omission of some duty of the master, which he
has confided to slich inferior eir-ploye. The liability of the
rjaster is thus mde to depend uron the character of thq act
iP the perfonnrice of which the injury arose, "i thout regard to
the rank of tb(- employe performing it. If it is one pertaining
tc the -duty the mtaster owes to his servants, he is responsible
tc them f'or the rPiarer of its perfoi-rice. The converse of t_
propcsit ion necessarily follows: If the act is one v4,ich
pertains only to the ! ,ty of one operative the er-ploye perform-
ing, it is ? mere servmrt. :nd the raster is rot lipble to C"
fellow servent for its improper perfor-nrce."
In the !ost few pages re ive I'.,ie ? careful examina-
ticn of the loctrine of the ron-liability o.- -mrloyers for in-
juries to their employes through the ne;ligace of cc-(iipcyes,
its oriir and growth, and the various tests in the several
states by ihich it is determired whether th.-y are or ar- not
entitled to the exemption. We no- come to the rcst important
part o + our subject, viz:
4. Statutary ,liactmr.ts. For n:any years there seem.s to
have been little or ro legislation in ary of the States upon
this stubject. Consemietly what iCw we -c fin in the early
developme nt an'! a-plication of the doctrine ir this country is
jud ge pnade an1d judge a?,?lied law. There else arose in the earl,
history and develcrrent of this branch of the law a sentinmt
in -,ny of the states thpt the 1octrine as aplied by the
courts was altogether too broad, and was being carried intc
fields -,,here its ri.riol enforcement oas mary times defeated the
vrry object of its existence, besides producing great ha.rdship
-Ind injustice. The protest has been a--inst the inIiscrimirate
aPPlicat .on of the doctrine excusing irat corporat ions carryirg
on enterprises of extremely haznr-1cus characters uron the sFnre
grounds that a master of a small *ar'! comparatively safe bus-
iress 3nploying but a few servants, an4 I evoting his rersonal
supervision to all the Aanagan rt and dlet-Jls of the same, is
exctqsed. This protest is male principly apairst its free aP-
plication in the case of rail roa- corporations. Let us
glpnce et the facts and see if there are grounIs sufficimit
to subtiin this position.
By recent statistics we learn that there are now in
operation in the United States about tyro hurlred thousand
miles ot' rail roal, requking the employment of over a million
persons. That in the y,_ar 1892, accorin-4 to th3 inter-state
commerce colnirssion, 2600 railroaI :-mployes were killed, ard
2600 injured in rail roai sccildents alone. This makes a larger"'
percentage of killeI ani inlred to the number emplcyed, thr.
in any other known employment, which proves that this million
of erployes are eng ged in -r exceedingl1,, i verons service.
Yet it must be remebered that it is against this very class
of er.Tloyes thit the ioctrine originated_ ar2! is now most fre-
quentiy an' rigidly enforced. While it is true that no ome
need er-nge in such service except he so chooses, and can make
allowece for the perils by the cmpersaticn tc be receive,
yret rFy believe that corporations wou l use more care to lessen
the Terils and -angers of their employes, if this exemptien focr
caxneges for injuri e to their servants w"as not so freely prl i od.
That this rule of the non-liability o_1 thl elTloyer irfm
!pplied to rail road corporaticrs is gengrally .eemed to be
harsh an-' nJust, we finJ illustr-a ed by th !- fact, that scarce-
ly had the loctrine been declarel in the M-ssachusets case
(Farwell v. Boston R.R.Co.) when the State of Georgia passed
an act declaring that such exe.pticn should not arply to rail-
roa-1 corporations in that state. But Georgis was rot alone
in this attack against the doctrine. Other states followed
suit until at the present time some ten or trelve of the
states of the Union have similar acts upon their statute bocks,
and the subject is b-ing vigorously agitated in several of the
states where the comnmon law ruile still prevails.
We voild also call attention to the following fact as
bearing u pon the argumnt just made, en-1 in our mind of no
smmll signifigance, namely: That one of the iost complote
and comprehensive acts passed in the United States is in force
in massachusets, the state first to recognize an1. apply the
doctrine of exemption. Let us examine some of these acts.
(A) The Massachusets act.
It is entitled, An Act to extend and regulate the
liabilitv of emplo,,rers to make compensation for
person-l injuries stffered by arplcyes in their
service.
It was passed in li 7, and section 1 r3als as follows:
Section 1. There, after the passage of this Act, per-
sonpl in jiury is caused to 7n employe ,ho is hirself in the
exercise of' -ue care 1nd diligence "nt the time:-
1. By reason of any -lefect in the condition of the rnys,
works or machinery connected , rth or 11se1 in the busiress Cf
the employer, or of any person in the service of the erllcyer
which arose from or had not beeon discovered o" r'rnidi owing
zo the negligence of the eriployer, or of any person in the
service of the erployer, and entrusted by him rith the K(11ty
of seeing th-t the '2,ys, ,';orks or machinery rcre in -rcper
conlition" or
?. By reason of the negligence of any person in the ser-
vice of the employer, entrusted with .and exercising super-
intendence, whose sole duty or principle duty is that of
sup erint er.denc e.
3. By reason of the ne,iligence of ny perscn in the
service of the employer orho has the charge or control cf any
signal, switch, locomotive engine or train opun a rnilroad,
the employe or in case the injury results in death the legal
representatives of such Employe shall have the same right
of comipensation and remedies against the erployers as if the
emnploye had not been an emlpluye of or in the service of the
employer, nor engaged in its ork.
Section 3. Limits the amount receivable in case of
personal iniury not to exceed four thousand dollars, anrt- in
case of death, not less their five thunted and not i,,cre than
five thousand dollirs, to be assessed with reference to the
degree of ne41iY-nce of the eirplover or the person cr whose
negligence he is rde liable.
Section 5, debarrs-the employe from recovery where he
did- rot ,;ive notice of known defects withirt a reascnable tim 3.
Section 7 cnd4_ tre last, states that the act shall not
'arply to in.uries caused to domestic servqrts or f xr_ laborers,
by other -f llo,, (ployes.
(B) The Georia Act.
By the folloring secmons of an Act passed by the
legislature of' Georgia, it is clear that a recovery is'allowed
ithe wa ot c e d
t ,he o.e caused by enother e1,rloye and was not cars
by; th- faeult or n eligence of the employe hurt.
Thp Act was passed in !13.5, and in 1373 incorporated into
theair Cole.
S. ,083. Rail rood corroraticns -re cu-rorP carriers
ar-I liable Ps such. At such comnaries have necessarily many
aloyes vro cunnot possibly control those who shovid exer-
cise care and !iience in the runrning of trains, SuCht cm-
pany! snall be liable tc such emploves, as tc pssen ;ers fcr
injuries arising from -he want of such care arAT dili.,erce.
S. 3036. If the perscn injured is himself Fr m-u'lcye
i' the -4r-age oascaused bV another er'rloye, an" .,'ithout ffilt
or ne,!igence on the part of the person injured, his employ-
rent by the comnpany shall not be a b-r tc th- recovery.
(C) The Iowa Act.
The following act was passed by the legislatr-e of Iowa
in 1862 an-3 reads as follos: "
4evry corporation operating a rail reai shall be liable for
all djamages sustained by any person incluling employes of
such corporation, in consequence of the ne;lect of ag;ents,
or by any mismanagement of the enijneers or other emlcyes
of the corporation, and in consequence of the villfl wrongs,
whether of cu-mniission or omission, of snch ag ants, on;ineers,
or other emplo!es, wlhen such wrongs are in any manner ccn-
nectel ,rith the use and operation of any rail ad or or
about Arhich they shall be ei ployel; ?nd no contract hieh
restricts such liability shall be leg l er7 binlin .
(To) The Kansas Act.
In 1374 the FollofrAig Act passeA th legislature of
Vansas:
ev, ery rail roai company organize'. or crin; business in
this state, shall be liable for all ciages !ne to any
emlove of sch company in consequence of ary no;-ig rce of
its agents, or by any nisconluct of its engineers or other
employes to any person sustaining such 'Pmages.
( ) Similar Acts in other States.
Similar acts to those ,iven abueve have beer Pss, i4
other states. Some Conflnin t'eir alication to rail rcad
corporations ar-1 others so broad 7,s to cover most of the Ircn-er-
ot's occup'tions. In Rhc-l- Islr the, have ar act that not
orly p elies to rail rca-Is but ernbrarces 1iI ccri' on carrie-rs.
It was enact e-i in l,92.
Tt vrill be seen from -r exji.iration ot' thr3 Iore;sei ncts
that the serv-rt hvro seeks tc recover -m.'er these stt tes v ust
be from ne-41igence, bnt that in this resFect he is held only to
the exercise of or-inery care, such as a man of or'inary jude-
rent an-I prudence woll. exercise uirler like circiimst -rces, arnd
that in mytost of the states the acts especially invalidate -,ry
contract relinrinr the liability imposed upon the ei.plyers.
(F) Are such Acts Constitutional?
For scmetime after the p-ssage of therse acts it w'--s
ccnten-le-i by riny that such acts .ra constitilt or--1 as they
were especiall, Jirected agairst roil roa -1 corporaticrs, but
the Surree Court of _' th_ Unite-1 States in lS8, in examining
the validity of the 1Kansas Act (1) tclarerl that they do net
Jeprive e r'il roa-i company of its property rithout due process
of ia:jr, -1o not "Ieny to it th- equal protection of the law, an
pro, rct in conflict Pith the fourteenth amenlnent tc the corL
stitot.on of t,-e Uite 7 St'-tes. JYuvre Field w-'ho wrotle the2
(1) Missouri Pac. R.R.Co. v- Macksey, 127 U.S. 205.
Opinion in tnat case said: "The only qestion for our exesnin-
atioi, .s to the law of 1874 is presented to "s ir t 'is case,
is Whether it is in conflict i"ith clauses cf tre frurteenth
zr en-ment. The sipposed hardship Fnd injistice consists in
imputin ' liability t~o the c mpnay ,here no pe-s,,n1l wrcng or
negli:,ence is chargeable to it, or its directors. But th3 same
hardship and in.justice, if tb ere be mny, exists when tre company
\eithout -ny wron- or negligence on its part is crerg. W ith
injuries to p ssengers, wthat ever cre - r2n rrecaltir ray be
tken in condructir4 its business or in selecting its servants,
if irnjury ha-ppen to the n-ssengers from the negli-ence or inccrr.-
petency, of the serv-ts, responsibilitv Trerefcr at crce attaches
tc it. The utmest core cn its part ,ill relieve it frow lir -
bility if the passenger injred be himself frum no-ligence.
The law of 1874 extends this docti-ire, -nd fixes - like liability
upon rail rca curporations Orhere injuries ?re subsequnrtly
siffered by employes, though it r'j'y be th, ne,-igort or inccr-
pet ncy of a fellow servant in the same g-reral emplc yment, nd
ectir,; under the me irmnediate direction. Thet its pEssage
wes within the competency of tne legislatlre vfe hai-e no doubt.
The objection that the l3-a of 1874 deprives the rail roal c rpan-
ics of the equ-.l Trotecticn of the low, is over less tenable
than the on- considered. It seems to rest upon the theory that
leisl2tion ' rich is special ir its character is recessary
ri th i the constituticnnl inhibition; but nothing car be further
fr. the f'Fct. The greater pert of -1l Ie:,islation is srecial
cither i-r the oblect sought to be att..re by it, cr ir th
extent of its aB1lcition. But the hazarluus character
Of the busin %s of operating a ra-l road -rould seer. tc fall for
a Special legislation with respect to rPil roe', ccrportiLry,
havin3 for its obiect the protection uf their 3],lcyes as wcll
Ps the safety of the public. The business cf other ccrror-
ations is not subject to similar Aangers to their' arpleyes
ad no ob'ection therefore ckr be meie to th.c le-islati n onr
the ground of it, -; iirg en uriust -. iscrimiratior. It meets
prectic-l necessity, arl! -11 r-il road, corpcT-ticrs :re vfitih-
out discriinat i'n made subject to the sere legislat-'on. As
said by the Court below, it is si-rdly -, r'estion of legislative
discretion rhether the sere liability shell be P i,'lied tc car-
riers by canal an1 stage co-,ches, ?nl to persons 'nd corpcra-
tiers using steey in miantifactries."
(G) The 7r)T-gish Yrloyers Liability Act.
'nr !yn' his a Truck Act, ard Er-1ployers end wcrki-r Act,
a Fecto' y Act and the nployers Liability Act. (1) The latter
wes passed in 1880. an' is the most im-crt-nt Ps wdc~lin, ,ith
the sublect at h-nd.
The Act nrovides ftve cases in rnich -n ePIlcyer is
,p.e li-ble for the result of r ersonel injury catised to his
-a to the s-me ext'rt t-ht he roUlA hj've been liable if
(!)(p ' -4 Vict. C. 4?)
the inpure r prson h!- not been a workman in his erFloy. The
f'e Cost. I. b , surnmarized as follows:
There the injiry is cfuse-1.
1. By Iefects in the condition of the r-ays, vwcrks, manchinery
or plIrt of the 'rrployer.
2. By the nc.,lience o: i superintendent or - rerscn ha,-in.;
siTerirtenlence entrusted tc him in the service cf the er.rloyer.
'. By improp-r orilers given by - person supcrior to the wcrk-
i an injired, to whose orders such worknen was boun tc ccrfcrm.
4. By obedience to imprcper rules or bylaws of the employer,
or to the improper instructions given by Prv person Iele,-t ed
with the employers authority.
5. BY the neli-ence of any person in tho Eervice of the
'mnloyer xho has tke charge or control o4 5r-y si,,r-.l poirts,
locomotive en-ine or train upnon a r2il road.
But tne er-nloye cannot recover if he is ;uilty of con-
tributo-y rfli orce, if the fellow servant by vl'bci he receives
his ir.uri -s wes at the time ictin-; outside the scope cf his
A'rties, or if he knew of tne a-nger ar- ii not worn the erplcy-
er or s ete st-perior o soh S r'n er, or knc'ri r of th 3 .nger
voluntarily incurs it.
C 0 N C L U S I 0 N.
We iv.ve now finisqei a hasty ?ar-l therefure very ircci-
plete ex'nmination of the law of the licbility of ov.ployers fc -
ir_.lris to thai- evwtloyes brouhbt -bout by ti'e neglignce cf
co-e r-Joyes. Btnt before t akir, our l.ve of tn 3 subject we
crrot refrain frcxr -3-'1irt, that there -re t,.c fediures corrected
w!th t is toic ,rhic' has nttr'cted our notice more !.hnr P.11
others, namely : Frst, the conflict of -lecisicjs -rd orinicns
'Jmonz, the learned ill-iges of the Stqte Co!rts, F Iso th3
conflict bet,,rea the State Courts Frd the Urit 0a States Ccrrts
lipon some puirts connected fxith our sub.ject. Secondl, the
eat m,,ount of Judicial Leislat ion to be found cuncerninrg this
qIest ion. As the latter -oes not properly come within our
province we fss it by weith this slight notice. As to th
former ve h-ve made only faint effort at hmomcnizaticr.. A
careful ex-'!inazion of' the aut roritits 'li show, *,e think, th!'t
nr.ar2ly -!i of the ,'olji s i_ rec ent cases , as to who 2re
£ollow serv.nts ar -q Mrho vice-princi nles, can be -,rcired - rler
the thre, h ads or te.sts gi,,er before, r -i, ely" The jassachusets
or comron ejjloyjment test; the United St~t es or 2rde s " ronk
test, "ri the '-'- Vorl, or r'e '-'tur- of t*'e' act t st.
While it is irpossible pt this -ritinr; to srek wAit
-r, , t.- as to ;"hat the trenr of .udi cil -!ecis icrs will
be in the futire, uintil sever-l iirport-rnt c!ses that Fre now
bef'ore the Suprerre Court of the Urite States heve beon deteor-
m.ired, yet we '.e not hesitate ir salirg, t-nt 'ithout doubt the
ten1lencr of the Americ-n Courts is ,t the present, Frr'. will be
ir the futLr e, to be overne'l more and. rc re by the principles cf
right an jistice which each case s"-_1l present, than by prac-
tices e precedence of the pqst that hive lcng since become
i Irlicable to th- . cordition cf a'firs as they exist tc-lay.
Capital or labor can never enjoy perfect success in
I
their respective fields as long as th-y re'unfrier.dly with each
other; but such unfriendly rel ations oill continue to exist be-
twen them as !on. as one is beinr supported at. the expense
Cf the other. In the union of c!_pit-i ar' Ichbor cr Th s-r,-e
ccm. or purTyose, pro.uctior rd profit, th ere should also be a
shp rirg in the incilt-rts .b well -s in the. profits. If labor
is asked to en ege in some .-.szardous urrdortankir i which capital
is -o profit as well -s labor, if successinl, the rosr'its of
failure or e ccident should be borne by both in proportion to
their respective interests. Neither shoul lbor insist upon
capit,'ls bearin ; burdns that are unjust and inequitable.
In :ll these respects we believe that thNewTa York
test is by far the most satisfactory ?n-" ,ust of ?11 the: cthers.
The nature of the act Jetenines rhere th.e res-rcnsibility shrill
rest. If the ne-ligence pertairs to some duty which th, em-
ployer ow,'s to his serv-nts, thr the'3 erloyer is liable for any
of the results ari-sin , from its non or impr oer pfrfc'i : - ce; btlt
iff the ect of er-ce nv-s ir r 1Ption to soe ty of r
ororativ3, th emnloye ercnning it is ,, i.ere serv~rt "n. it
beccres un'e of the risks inci'Tent tc th2 Ivr1o ,Trent vrhiAh ll
persor. take tpon entrin into the :er~ice.
y 7/ /2 "/,
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